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OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Somerset Valley Rehabilitation and Nursing Center 
(“Somerset” or the “Employer”), known formally as 1621 
Route 22 West Operating Company, LLC, petitions for 
review of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB” or the “Board”) that declared Somerset had 
committed several unfair labor practices in violation of 
Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 158.  The Board cross-applies for enforcement of 
that Order.  We will deny the petition for review and grant the 
cross-application for enforcement. 
 
I. Background 
 
This dispute arises out of a union election and its 
aftermath at Somerset in 2010.  The nurses at the facility 
organized under the auspices of 1199 SEIU United 
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Healthcare Workers East, New Jersey Region (the “Union”), 
which is an intervenor in this case in support of the Board.  
According to the Union and the Board, Somerset engaged in 
unfair labor practices – both during and after the election – in 
an effort to discourage the exercise of labor rights. 
 
We begin by recounting the background of the dispute 
and the lengthy procedural history that brings it before us 
now.  Under the NLRA, “[t]he findings of the Board with 
respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial 
evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be 
conclusive.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).  Given the deference we thus 
owe to the Board’s fact-finding, and further given that 
Somerset’s objections are principally to the Board’s legal 
conclusions, we recount the facts as found by the Board, 
which itself adopted the findings of the Administrative Law 
Judge (“ALJ”) who initially heard the complaint against 
Somerset.   
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Somerset is a 32-room, 64-patient-maximum nursing 
and rehabilitation center in Bound Brook, New Jersey, 
operated since 2006 by CareOne Management, Inc. 
(“CareOne”), a manager of multiple nursing and 
rehabilitation facilities.  Somerset employs about 75 nurses in 
the relevant bargaining unit, which comprises registered 
nurses (RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and certified 
nurses’ aides (CNAs).  The ranks of the nurses include full-
time employees, part-time employees, and “per diem” 
employees who work “as needed” and without a regular 
schedule.  (J.A. 10.)  In addition, Somerset employs 
supervisory nurses who act as managers.  When a supervisory 
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nurse is not on duty, a senior nonsupervisory nurse will serve 
as a “charge nurse” to be the “link between the floor nurse 
and the physician.”  (J.A. 10.) 
 
1. Pre-Election Period 
 
The unionization drive began around June 2010, when 
Elizabeth Heedles, the Administrator of the facility, 
announced that Somerset would be reducing working hours 
and changing employees’ schedules.  Several nurses, 
including Sheena Claudio, Shannon Napolitano, and Jillian 
Jacques, were concerned about the new schedules they were 
asked to follow.  One of the supervisory nurses, Jacqueline 
Southgate, who would become a key witness for the Union, 
was also troubled that her full-time schedule was to be 
downgraded.   
 
Somerset emphasizes that, prior to the announced 
scheduling changes, the New Jersey Department of Health 
and Senior Services conducted a survey of the facility in 
December 2009 that resulted in two citations for violations of 
state standards.1  As the ALJ later characterized the violations, 
“[t]he surveyors did not believe that a patient’s pain was 
adequately controlled by the nurse assigned to her care.”  (J.A. 
12.)  Somerset suggests that the poor survey “resulted in 
increased scrutiny on the Somerset nursing department” and 
led it to begin revamping its operations to improve care.  
(Opening Br. at 8.)  The ALJ, however, disagreed and saw the 
                                              
1 Specifically, Somerset received two “G” ratings for 
pain assessment.  A “G” rating indicates that the error is 
“isolated in nature,” but that the resident received “actual 
harm.”  (J.A. 3039.) 
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survey violations as routine, suggesting that Somerset’s 
characterization was a post hoc pretext for anti-union actions.  
According to the ALJ, it was “common” for a facility to be 
cited for deficiencies, and, in this case, Somerset “corrected 
the deficiencies within a couple of weeks after receiving the 
report, and submitted a written plan of correction in late 
December 2009,” which the state accepted.  (J.A. 12.)  A state 
recertification survey in January 2010, just a month after the 
original survey, found that Somerset was in substantial 
compliance, though the survey report did recommend a 27-
day $200-per-day penalty for the December violations.   
 
Whatever the motive for the operational changes at 
Somerset, they prompted concern among the nurses.  Jacques 
responded by contacting CareOne’s Vice President of Human 
Resources, Andrea Lee, who promised to “look into it.”  (J.A. 
10.)  Lee visited the facility, met with several nurses, 
expressed surprise about the large-scale changes, and 
promised to continue looking into it.  She did not, however, 
follow up with the nurses any further.  Consequently, they 
made contact with the Union and met with Union organizer 
Brian Walsh in late June 2010.   
 
Claudio, Napolitano, and Jacques then began speaking 
about the Union with their colleagues at Somerset and 
generated interest from several other nurses, including 
Southgate, Valerie Wells, and Lynette Tyler.  They prepared 
a pro-Union YouTube video, distributed and collected Union 
authorization cards,2 held meetings at employees’ homes and 
                                              
2 Although a Board-supervised election is “[t]he most 
commonly traveled route for a union to obtain recognition as 
the exclusive bargaining representative of an unorganized 
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at a local diner, and organized employees to wear pro-Union 
stickers.  Their campaign culminated in a July 22, 2010 
petition for a union election submitted to the Board by nurses 
Jacques and Napolitano and organizer Walsh.  The Union 
then circulated to Somerset’s employees a pro-Union 
brochure with photographs of 35 employees, including 
Claudio, Jacques, Napolitano, and Wells.  Somerset 
acknowledges that “Napolitano, Claudio, and Jacques were 
among the leaders in the Union organizing campaign.”  
(Opening Br. at 9 (citing J.A. 1673).) 
 
Just over a week after the union petition was filed, 
CareOne’s regional director, Jason Hutchens, brought Doreen 
Illis into Somerset to replace Heedles as Administrator.  Illis 
was transferred from a substantially larger CareOne facility, 
and Heedles took over at the facility that Illis left.  The ALJ 
expressed doubt that Heedles was shifted for reasons of 
effectiveness, noting that she was transferred to lead a facility 
with double the number of beds, and that CareOne was aware 
of the disenchantment with the scheduling changes at 
Somerset.  Somerset made other management changes in 
                                                                                                     
group of employees,” an alternative way for a union to 
establish majority support is “possession of cards signed by a 
majority of the employees authorizing the union to represent 
them for collective bargaining purposes.”  NLRB v. Gissel 
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596-97 (1969).  A union that 
collects authorization cards for a majority of employees can 
thus claim to be the exclusive bargaining representative for 
employees pursuant to § 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(a).  Claudio, Napolitano, and Jacques were distributing 
that type of card to fellow nurses, though ultimately a union 
election was held. 
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August 2010, including bringing in Inez Konjoh as a 
replacement Director of Nursing and giving Southgate 
management responsibilities.   
 
2. Election Campaign 
 
By late July, after the union petition was filed, an 
election campaign was in full swing.  Somerset campaigned 
vigorously against the union – as it had a right to do – but in 
so doing it undertook actions that the Board later concluded 
crossed the line into unfair labor practices. 
 
Hutchens held several meetings with employees and 
received their complaints about the controversial schedule 
changes.  That schedule was ultimately not implemented.  In 
the meetings, Hutchens apologized for the proposed changes 
and said that he had brought in a new Administrator and 
Director of Nursing to rectify the problems.  When employees 
pressed him about ongoing problems, he noted that any policy 
changes during the union election would be illegal, but he 
asked the employees to give Somerset a chance to show them 
that things could improve.  Several employees testified about 
the meetings and further indications from CareOne managers 
that they would “fix” things.  (J.A. 31)  Several employees 
also testified that managers talked to them personally about 
the Union and urged them to vote against it.   
 
Though he denied any unlawful activity, Hutchens 
acknowledged that the Employer ran a “vote no” campaign.  
(J.A. 14.)  He and other Somerset officials held general 
meetings and spoke with nurses at the nursing stations.  Chris 
Foglio, the Chief Executive Officer of CareOne, met with 
employees and discussed benefits that CareOne might offer, 
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including support for housing expenses and tuition 
reimbursement.  Management held meetings within its own 
ranks, discussing Union activities and how each individual 
nurse might vote.  It also distributed leaflets to employees to 
dissuade them from voting for the union.   
 
Management rectified some specific complaints during 
the campaign.  When one nurse, Annie Stubbs, complained 
about a lack of garbage bags, garbage bags were distributed 
the next day.  When Tyler told Illis her responsibilities were 
overwhelming her, a week later her duties were reduced at 
about the same time that Illis asked her to convince other 
employees to vote against the Union.   
 
The election was finally held on September 2, 2010.  
Out of 71 votes cast, 38 were for the Union and 28 against, 
with five ballots being subject to challenge.  After hearing 
and overruling Somerset’s objections, an NLRB hearing 
officer certified the Union in January 2011, a decision 
affirmed and certified by the Board in August 2011.   
 
3. Post-Election Acts of Alleged  
 Retaliation 
 
At issue in this case is the Board’s conclusion that 
Napolitano, Claudio, Jacques, and Wells were discharged as 
retaliation for their unionization activities.  Claudio, Jacques, 
and Napolitano were “the three leading union advocates.”  
(J.A. 32)  They contacted the Union and worked with Walsh 
to organize the nurses at Somerset; they appeared in the 
Union brochure and YouTube video; and they served as the 
Union’s election observers.  Wells also appeared in the 
YouTube video and in the brochure; she signed an 
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authorization card for the Union; and she spoke favorably 
about the Union at work.  Those facts, paired with the 
conclusion that Somerset’s “animus toward the Union is 
beyond question,” led the ALJ to decide that the union 
activities of those women “were well known to” Somerset, 
which then targeted them for retaliation.  (J.A. 32.) 
 
The first set of actions that formed the basis for the 
NLRB’s investigation of post-election events at the nursing 
home concerned Somerset’s enforcement of its attendance 
policy.  Only 11 days after the election, Somerset issued two 
attendance warnings to Jacques, two to Claudio, and one to 
Napolitano, even though “[t]hey had not received written 
discipline prior to the election for the[ir] ... attendance 
records.”  (J.A. 32.)  The timing was troublesome – before the 
election, Somerset was lax with regard to attendance, but 
immediately after the election Konjoh took a personal interest 
in tardiness.  Illis did not begin to focus on attendance until 
six weeks into her tenure as Administrator, after the election.  
Not only did the three nurses receive discipline for recent 
attendance issues, they were disciplined for lateness and 
absences dating back to nine months prior to the election.  
Before the election, only one employee had ever received 
formal discipline for attendance problems.   
 
The second set of Somerset’s actions at issue before 
the Board had to do with performance-based discipline.  That 
discipline became significantly stricter immediately after the 
election.  The ALJ concluded that 
 
[medicine and treatment] records were not 
scrutinized as carefully before the election as 
they were after the election, and ... any errors in 
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those records found prior to the election were 
rarely the subject of discipline. For example, 
[Somerset] offered in evidence numerous 
examples of discipline given to employees after 
the election for performance issues, but could 
only present three instances of discipline prior 
to the election. Even as to them, the maximum 
discipline issued was a written warning. 
 
(J.A. 33.) 
 
There were also suspicious circumstances, in the 
ALJ’s view, surrounding the dismissal of each of the four 
employees at issue.  Claudio received her first warning ever 
on September 20 and her second on September 27. She 
received a two-day suspension on October 1, which was 
unusually severe compared to another nurse who committed 
the same infraction.  Finally, she was discharged on 
October 21 for an infraction – completing medical chart 
entries after her shift rather than during it – which was a “not 
uncommon” practice according to Southgate’s testimony.  
(J.A. 34.) 
 
Jacques had worked at Somerset for 11 years.  She was 
discharged for record-keeping errors that, prior to the election, 
“would have been remedied with in-service training” and for 
which “other nurses received less discipline.”  (J.A. 34.)  The 
sudden discharge came even as Somerset continued to put 
Jacques in the senior role of charge nurse, acknowledging her 
“experience and expertise.”  (J.A. 7.)  Moreover, Southgate 
testified that Konjoh told her that Somerset management was 
watching union organizers closely for infractions, and an 
employee who was a confidant of Illis’s testified that “Illis 
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told him to look for errors committed by Jacques in her 
charting.”  (J.A. 34.) 
 
Napolitano was discharged two weeks after the 
election for improperly administering a zinc pill to a patient.  
She did improperly administer the pill, but Konjoh seemed 
intent on collecting evidence to support disciplinary action 
because she had instructed the patient to save any improperly 
administered pills rather than correct an error when 
discovered.  Three other nurses made the same mistake and 
faced no discipline.  A second reason cited for Napolitano’s 
dismissal was that she noted a patient’s pulse oxygen level at 
0%, “an obvious error in documentation” that would have 
been “simply corrected” before the election.  (J.A. 35.) 
 
Wells was a staffing coordinator at Somerset for five 
years before the election and had not previously been 
disciplined.  She was on vacation during the election, and 
when she returned to work five days afterward, she was given 
a disciplinary warning for the first time.  She had failed to 
reconcile discrepancies between manually typed schedules 
and entries in the computerized system for the prior 
weekend’s shifts.  Somerset’s past practice would have 
allowed her to have the morning to correct the scheduling 
inconsistencies on her first day back.  Instead, she was written 
up, and she received two more warnings the following week 
for mistakes in inputting employee schedules and a failure to 
provide Konjoh a written schedule.  She was discharged on 
September 21, within three weeks of the election.  The ALJ 
acknowledged that the scheduling errors and failure to 
properly use the electronic system were problematic, but he 
concluded that the sudden and rapid discipline following the 
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election suggested that the true motivation for Wells’s 
discharge was retaliation.   
 
The ALJ found two additional retaliatory acts against 
other employees.  First, when union-supporter Tyler left 
Somerset, her records were marked with a notation that she 
was “not eligible for rehire – resigned with bad attitude 
toward company.”  (J.A. 35.)  She received this negative 
notation, even though before the election Illis had encouraged 
her to stay or take advantage of a tuition-assistance program.  
Separately, Somerset dropped several per diem employees 
within the two to three weeks following the election.  To find 
replacements, Illis solicited a per diem nurse at another 
CareOne facility to come to Somerset and recommend other 
per diem employees who “would vote in [Somerset’s] favor 
in a new election” if the results of the first election were 
overturned.  (J.A. 36.) 
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
Somerset’s anti-union activities led the Union to file 
charges with the NLRB, all of which were eventually 
consolidated into a complaint issued on April 6, 2011.  After 
19 days of hearings, the ALJ issued a decision against 
Somerset.  The Board adopted the ALJ’s decision in its 
September 26, 2012 Order (the “2012 Order”).   
 
While the Board was considering the case, it separately 
sought temporary injunctive relief before the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey, under § 10(j) of 
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j).3  The District Court granted in 
                                              
3 Under § 10(j) of the NLRA, “[t]he Board shall have 
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part and denied in part the injunctive relief, ordering the 
reinstatement of Napolitano and Claudio but denying 
reinstatement to Jacques and Wells.  That decision was 
ultimately vacated by our Court in Lightner ex rel. NLRB v. 
1621 Route 22 West Operating Co., LLC, 729 F.3d 235 (3d 
Cir. 2013), because the Board’s September 2012 Order made 
the § 10(j) proceedings moot.  We noted, however, that 
“[v]acating the opinion and order entered by the District 
Court ... will have no effect on the existence or record of the 
proceedings before it,” and that “we know of no ruling that 
would hinder Somerset ... from relying on appropriate facts in 
the District Court record.”  Id. at 238. 
 
 Subsequently, in June 2014, the Supreme Court ruled 
in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014), that 
several members of the Board had been appointed in violation 
of the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution.  We 
then granted the Board’s motion to vacate the 2012 Order and 
to remand because two members of the Board who sat on that 
three-member panel had been invalidly appointed in light of 
Noel Canning.  The Board issued a new Order on June 11, 
2015 (“2015 Order” or the “Order”), affirming its 2012 Order 
and the ALJ decision.  In addition to reaffirming those prior 
decisions, the Board expressly rejected the reasons that the 
District Court had given when denying complete relief in the 
                                                                                                     
power, upon issuance of a complaint ... charging that any 
person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor 
practice, to petition any United States district court, within 
any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is 
alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or 
transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or 
restraining order.”  29 U.S.C.§ 160(j). 
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§ 10(j) proceedings.  The Board reiterated the conclusion 
from the 2012 Order that, since “virtually all” of the 
discipline imposed for the supposed deficiencies of the 
employees was unlawfully motivated, such discipline could 
not be the basis for avoiding the remedy of reinstatement and 
back pay.  (J.A. 1.)  According to the Board, the errors 
ascribed to Jacques and Wells had long predated the union 
election and were merely pretexts that could not preclude 
reinstatement.   
 
Somerset petitioned us to review the 2015 Order, and 
the Board cross-applied for enforcement.  Those are the 
applications before us now. 
 
II. Jurisdiction 
 
The NLRB had jurisdiction over this matter under 29 
U.S.C. § 160(a).  We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s 
final order pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) and jurisdiction to 
consider the application for enforcement pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. § 160(e).  Our jurisdiction over particular issues, 
however, is limited by the exhaustion requirement embedded 
in that last statutory subjection, which is § 10(e) of the 
NLRA.  Section 10(e) provides that “[n]o objection that has 
not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or 
agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or 
neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of 
extraordinary circumstances.”  29 U.S.C. § 160(e).  The 
exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional.  Except in the rare 
case that presents extraordinary circumstances, a “Court of 
Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review objections that were not 
urged before the Board.”  Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 666 (1982). 
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The exhaustion requirement is important in this case 
because one of the principal grounds for review that Somerset 
urges upon us was never raised before the Board.  
Specifically, Somerset now contends that the NLRB’s Acting 
General Counsel was serving in violation of the Federal 
Vacancies Reform Act (“FVRA”), 5 U.S.C. § 3345, et seq., at 
the time he filed the initial complaint against Somerset, and 
that the subsequent actions of the Board are thus infirm.  That 
argument is new, so before we can address its merits, we must 
determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider it at all. 
 
Somerset argues that the lawfulness of the General 
Counsel’s service “is a jurisdictional issue that goes to the 
Board’s very authority to act,” suggesting that we may 
therefore review the issue despite the exhaustion bar in 
§ 10(e).  (Opening Br. at 38.)  As Somerset notes, the General 
Counsel of the NLRB has “final authority ... in respect of the 
investigation of charges and issuance of complaints” alleging 
unfair labor practices.  29 U.S.C. § 153(d).  Though the 
General Counsel may delegate authority to regional directors, 
29 C.F.R. § 101.8, “[t]he practical effect of [the NLRA’s] 
administrative scheme is that a party believing himself the 
victim of an unfair labor practice can obtain neither 
adjudication nor remedy under the labor statute without first 
persuading the Office of General Counsel that his claim is 
sufficiently meritorious to warrant Board consideration,” 
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 139 (1975). 
 
Somerset is certainly correct that the General Counsel 
of the NLRB plays a gate-keeping role in all unfair labor 
practices cases.  But that does not itself provide jurisdiction 
for us to review the lawfulness of the President’s designation 
of an Acting General Counsel.  Our jurisdiction to review the 
17 
 
acts of administrative agencies is a product of statutory grant, 
and Congress has broad discretion to determine the breadth of 
that jurisdiction.  See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 
323, 330 (1938) (“There can be no question of the power of 
Congress [] to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior 
courts of the United States.”).  Congress may, for instance, 
remove from federal courts the jurisdiction to issue 
injunctions in labor disputes.  Id. at 329-30.  It may require 
that challenges to a law be brought in “one tribunal rather 
than in another,” and parties may forfeit their rights “by the 
failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal 
having jurisdiction to determine it.”  Yakus v. United States, 
321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944).  The latter is precisely what 
Congress has done in § 10 of the NLRA.  Somerset’s 
admitted failure to follow the process that Congress 
established for challenging the lawfulness of the Board’s 
actions therefore precludes it from pressing its FVRA claim 
unless it can point to a specific grant of jurisdiction.4 
                                              
 
4 There are some limitations on Congress’s ability to 
regulate federal court jurisdiction.  As relevant here, there 
may be cases in which Congress makes challenging the 
lawfulness of government action in enforcement proceedings 
so burdensome that a party must be allowed to bring an 
independent action.  Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 148 
(1908).  But Somerset’s case does not require us to consider 
thorny boundary questions of federal court jurisdiction.  In 
the labor context, Congress has provided an orderly scheme 
allowing parties to challenge the lawfulness of the NLRB’s 
actions before the Board and then to seek review from a Court 
of Appeals if that challenge is unsuccessful.  Unsurprisingly, 
it requires that, through the exhaustion bar of § 10(e), the 
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Somerset’s argument that its FVRA claim is 
“jurisdictional” in nature – thereby giving us some inherent 
authority to review it – is unconvincing.  As the Supreme 
Court explained in City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 
1868 (2013), there is a significant difference between the 
concept of “jurisdiction” in the judicial context and in the 
administrative context.  In the former, “there is a meaningful 
line” between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions, 
because “[w]hether the court decided correctly is a question 
that has different consequences from the question whether it 
had the power to decide at all.”  Id. at 1868 (emphasis in 
original).  But, that is not the case in the latter, administrative, 
context.  When agencies are charged with administering 
congressional statutes, 
 
[b]oth their power to act and how they are to act 
is authoritatively prescribed by Congress, so 
that when they act improperly, no less than 
when they act beyond their jurisdiction, what 
they do is ultra vires.  Because the question – 
whether framed as an incorrect application of 
agency authority or an assertion of authority not 
conferred – is always whether the agency has 
gone beyond what Congress has permitted it to 
do, there is no principled basis for carving out 
some arbitrary subset of such claims as 
“jurisdictional.” 
 
Id. at 1869.  Therefore, if the Board was acting unlawfully in 
considering a complaint brought by an improperly serving 
                                                                                                     
Board be given a chance to address any objections in the first 
instance.  
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Acting General Counsel, its actions were no more ultra vires 
than if the Board had misapplied the NLRA.  We consider 
both sorts of claims under the strictures of that statute, 
including the exhaustion bar of § 10(e).  Again, that bar 
permits consideration of arguments not raised before the 
Board only when late consideration can be justified by 
“extraordinary circumstances.”  29 U.S.C. § 160(e). 
 
 To overcome that straightforward reading of both the 
NLRA and long-established case law on Congress’s power to 
shape federal appellate court jurisdiction, Somerset leans 
heavily on two sentences from our opinion in NLRB v. Konig, 
stating that there is a 
 
distinction between jurisdiction in the sense of 
the overall authority of the Board to hear the 
case under the NLRA and the jurisdiction of the 
Board to issue an order based upon a factual 
determination made by the Board.  “While the 
Board’s statutory jurisdiction may be raised at 
any time, the facts upon which the Board 
determines it has jurisdiction may be challenged 
only upon timely exception.” 
 
79 F.3d 354, 360 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting NLRB v. Peyton 
Fritton Stores, Inc., 336 F.2d 769, 770 (10th Cir. 1964)).  
Based on that quotation, Somerset argues that it may raise its 
challenge regarding the Acting General Counsel “at any time” 
because the issue implicates “the overall authority of the 
Board to hear the case.”  Id.  That position cannot prevail for 
three reasons. 
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 First it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
instruction in City of Arlington that any distinction between a 
“jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” exercise of agency 
authority is merely “illusory.”  133 S. Ct. at 1869.  The Court 
was there considering deference to agency interpretations of 
statutes, but the logic applies equally to judicial review of an 
agency’s adjudicatory process.  To rephrase the principle 
noted above, “[b]oth [the Board’s] power to act and how [it] 
act[s] [are] authoritatively prescribed by Congress,” and when 
the Board “act[s] improperly” what it does is ultra vires “no 
less than when [it] act[s] beyond [its] jurisdiction.”  Id.  City 
of Arlington tells us plainly that we are not supposed to “sift[] 
the entrails of vast statutory schemes to divine whether a 
particular” exercise of agency authority “qualifies as 
‘jurisdictional’ ... .”  Id. at 1871.   
 
 Second, the language in Konig is too general to 
support Somerset’s conclusion that we are free to review 
unexhausted challenges to agency action whenever such a 
challenge can be framed as “jurisdictional.”  The case does 
not define what is meant by “the overall authority of the 
Board to hear the case under the NLRA.”  Konig, 79 F.3d at 
360.  Nor does it explain whether we may hear those 
challenges based on some inherent power or because they 
meet the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to the 
exhaustion bar of § 10(e).  Somerset’s “inherent power” 
theory would be a novel assertion of judicial authority, and 
we decline to read that much into such vague language. 
 
That particular passage from Konig also happens to be 
dicta, which is the third reason we decline to read it as 
allowing Somerset to avoid the exhaustion bar.  In the 
paragraph immediately following Konig’s distinction between 
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“the overall authority of the Board to hear the case under the 
NLRA and the jurisdiction of the Board to issue an order 
based upon a factual determination made by the Board,” we 
went on to rule that the issue raised in Konig was the latter 
type of case, based on a “factual determination by the Board.”  
79 F.3d at 360.  We applied the exhaustion bar of § 10(e) and 
refused to hear the claim, id. at 361, so there was no need to 
consider any broader form of authority to review 
“jurisdictional” challenges, since none was implicated in 
Konig.5  Thus, any observations in the opinion about broader 
jurisdiction were irrelevant to the holding and do not bind us 
now.  Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 
(3d Cir. 2007). 6 
                                              
5 The same was true in the Tenth Circuit case from 
which Konig draws the key language at issue here.  That court 
also declined to consider the petitioner’s objection, as it was a 
factual question barred by the exhaustion requirement.  
Peyton Fritton, 336 F.2d at 770 (“No exceptions having been 
taken, and no extraordinary circumstances appearing which 
would excuse their absence, the facts upon which jurisdiction 
was found are not now subject to question.”). 
 
6 Somerset also leans heavily on our opinion in NLRB 
v. New Vista Nursing & Rehabilitation, 719 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 
2013), reh’g granted (Aug. 11, 2014), which does indeed 
more directly support its argument.  But that opinion was 
vacated when rehearing was granted, so it carries no 
precedential force.  See Third Circuit I.O.P. 8.3.1.  To the 
extent that it diverges from our reasoning, we respectfully 
decline to follow it. 
The New Vista panel read Konig broadly and asserted 
an inherent jurisdiction to review agency authority to act, 
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 Our conclusion accords with the developing consensus 
of other courts that have considered this issue.  In addressing 
challenges to the appointments of members of the Board itself, 
three Circuits have determined that they need not hear 
objections that were unpreserved.  D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 
737 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2013); GGNSC Springfield LLC v. 
NLRB, 721 F.3d 403, 406 (6th Cir. 2013); NLRB v. RELCO 
Locomotives, Inc., 734 F.3d 764, 798 (8th Cir. 2013). 7   
When the D.C. Circuit did hear such an unpreserved 
argument, it was not because the objection was 
“jurisdictional,” but rather because the objection satisfied the 
“extraordinary circumstances” exception to the § 10(e) 
exhaustion bar.  Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 496 
(D.C. Cir. 2013).  Our Court recently expressly adopted the 
D.C. Circuit’s logic to hold that unexhausted post-Noel 
                                                                                                     
based largely on analogy to courts of appeals reviewing 
district courts’ jurisdiction.  719 F.3d at 210-12.  Because 
New Vista was decided before the City of Arlington opinion 
issued, the panel did not have the benefit of the Supreme 
Court’s explanation of why a “jurisdictional” versus 
“nonjurisdictional” contrast is inapposite in the administrative 
law context.  We are bound to follow the Supreme Court’s 
instruction that treating any particular question of agency 
action as “jurisdictional” is “arbitrary.”  City of Arlington, 
133 S. Ct. at 1869. 
 
7  In fact, before the Supreme Court abandoned the 
distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional 
exercises of agency authority in City of Arlington, it expressly 
characterized constitutional Appointments Clause objections 
as “nonjurisdictional.”  Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 878 
(1991). 
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Canning challenges to the composition of the NLRB may be 
heard because they satisfy the “extraordinary circumstances” 
exception to § 10(e).  Advanced Disposal Servs. E., Inc. v. 
NLRB, No. 15-2229, 2016 WL 1598607, at *4 (3d Cir. 
Apr. 21, 2016).8 
 
All of those cases concerned challenges to the 
authority of the Board itself to act based on the constitutional 
infirmity of its members’ appointments.  Even in those cases, 
courts have looked only to the “extraordinary circumstances” 
exception to § 10(e) rather than to some non-statutory ground 
to excuse a failure to exhaust.  Somerset now asks us to create 
an even broader exception to § 10(e) for its statutory 
challenge to the Acting General Counsel’s appointment.  We 
decline to do so.  That puts us in accord with the principal 
opinion upon which Somerset relies to support its FVRA 
defense, in which the D.C. Circuit expressed doubt that the 
argument then before it, if unpreserved, could be raised in 
court.  See SW Gen., Inc. v. NLRB, 796 F.3d 67, 83 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (“We doubt that an employer that failed to timely raise 
an FVRA objection ... will enjoy ... success.”).9 
                                              
8  A footnote in the Advanced Disposal opinion 
suggested that a violation of the NLRB’s quorum requirement 
may “be considered ‘jurisdictional’ in the sense that a 
challenge brought under it cannot be forfeited by failure to 
raise it before the agency.”  2016 WL 1598607, at *4 n.6.  We 
expressly noted, however, that the observation was “not 
necessary to our holding,” id., so it is dicta that does not now 
bind us, Galli, 490 F.3d at 274. 
 
9  Somerset also urges us to consider a recent Ninth 
Circuit opinion endorsing Somerset’s and the D.C. Circuit’s 
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 Since Somerset has no way around the § 10(e) 
exhaustion requirement, we lack jurisdiction to consider its 
FVRA objection unless its “failure ... to urge such objection 
[is] excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”  29 
U.S.C. § 160(e).  Somerset’s briefing, however, makes no 
mention of the extraordinary circumstances exception.  At 
oral argument, Somerset acknowledged that the “focus of [its] 
argument” was on the assertion of some broader jurisdiction 
than is granted in the “extraordinary circumstances” 
exception to § 10(e).  (Oral Arg. Tr. 6.)  We therefore have no 
argument before us as to why the present circumstances are 
so extraordinary as to warrant review without the Board 
having had the first opportunity to address Somerset’s 
objection. 10   Consequently, we will apply the § 10(e) 
                                                                                                     
interpretation of the FVRA.  See Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant 
Support Servs., Inc., No. 13-35912, 2016 WL 860335 (9th 
Cir. Mar. 7, 2016).  That case arose from a § 10(j) proceeding 
for interim injunctive relief, where the employer raised its 
FVRA objection before the district court at the first 
opportunity.  Id. at *2.  It thus does not bear on the issue of 
the § 10(e) exhaustion bar.   If anything, the Hooks court 
sought to limit the reach of its ruling by expressly noting that 
“not ... every violation of the FVRA will result in the 
invalidation of the challenged agency action.”  Id. at *11. 
 
10 In a filing well after the completion of briefing and 
oral argument, Somerset suggests that our Court’s Advanced 
Disposal opinion “confirms that Somerset may present the 
[FVRA] issue now, even thought it did not raise the issue 
below.”  (Somerset 28(j) Letter, at 2, Apr. 26, 2016.)  
Somerset’s briefing relied exclusively on the extra-statutory 
jurisdictional basis to excuse its failure to exhaust, and its 
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exhaustion bar, and, lacking jurisdiction to consider 
Somerset’s objection to the Board’s order on the basis of the 
FVRA, we will proceed to consider only those objections 
“urged before the Board.”  29 U.S.C. § 160(e). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
Somerset petitions for review of the Board’s Order 
based on the following grounds.  First, it asks us to vacate the 
Order because Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce should have 
recused himself in response to Somerset’s motion for recusal.  
                                                                                                     
attempt to shift to an “extraordinary circumstances” argument 
comes far too late for us to consider it.  See In re Fosamax 
Products Liab. Litig., 751 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 2014). 
We pause only to note that, even if Somerset had 
properly advanced an “extraordinary circumstances” 
argument, Advanced Disposal would not be dispositive 
because its facts are so readily distinguishable from this case.  
Advanced Disposal involved “a challenge which [went] to the 
composition of the NLRB” itself, rather than to the authority 
of the Acting General Counsel.  2016 WL 1598607, at *4.  
Moreover, Advanced Disposal was based on a “rare and 
remarkable” recent Supreme Court decision resolving 
constitutional limitations on the President’s recess 
appointments power.  Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Somerset’s challenge, on the other hand, is based 
on the FVRA statutory scheme, which has been in place since 
1998.  See Pub. L. No. 105–277, div. C, tit. I, § 151.  Even 
were the “extraordinary circumstances” argument preserved, 
then, simple analogy to Advanced Disposal would be 
insufficient, on its own, to excuse Somerset’s failure to 
exhaust. 
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As to the merits of the Order, Somerset challenges the 
Board’s determination that its conduct involved unfair labor 
practices.  Finally, it argues that, even if it did violate the 
NLRA by dismissing certain employees, reinstatement is not 
the appropriate remedy in this case.  We consider each 
objection in turn. 
 
A. Motion to Recuse 
 
Somerset asks us to vacate the Board’s Order because, 
it says, Chairman Pearce should have recused himself from 
the three-member panel that heard this case.  According to 
Somerset, recusal was necessary because Ellen Dichner, who 
was serving as chief counsel to Chairman Pearce, had 
previously represented the Union in this very case, both 
before the ALJ and in the § 10(j) proceedings.  While 
Somerset does not allege that Dichner participated in the 
Board’s consideration of this case in any way, it argues that 
there is an inevitable appearance of impropriety because her 
subordinates would feel obliged to support her former client’s 
position in their discussions with Chairman Pearce.   
 
The Board denied Somerset’s motion for recusal in its 
2015 Order.  It acknowledged that “Dichner, while in earlier 
private practice, represented the Charging Party Union in this 
case up to the exceptions stage,” but contended that “Dichner 
has taken no part in the Board’s consideration of this case.”  
(J.A. 1 n.1.)  Evidently, it was unimpressed by the 
“appearance of impropriety” issue. 
 
“We review an agency member’s decision not to 
recuse himself from a proceeding under a deferential, abuse 
of discretion standard.”  Metro. Council of NAACP Branches 
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v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also 
Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1162 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(applying the same standard to recusal of district judges).  
That standard is premised on the principle that “‘deferential 
review is used when the matter under review was decided by 
someone who is thought to have a better vantage point than 
we on the Court of Appeals to assess the matter.’”  United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(quoting United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 234 (3d Cir. 
2004)). 11 
We therefore do not put ourselves in the position of 
Chairman Pearce or the Board and make the recusal decision 
anew; rather, we simply review whether the decision was 
                                              
11 Somerset urges us to apply a more exacting standard, 
quoting In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 308 (3d Cir. 
2004), for the proposition “that there is an almost irrebutable 
presumption that a judge is ‘tainted’ and must be disqualified 
where ... he surrounds himself with individuals who may not 
be truly disinterested.”  In that case, the district judge had 
appointed five advisors to assist him in a large asbestos case, 
and had a series of ex parte meetings with them.  Id. at 297-
98.  We concluded that two of the advisors had “a structural 
conflict of interests” because they were also representing 
clients in separate cases involving asbestos.  Id. at 303; see 
also id. at 304-05.  Because the advisors helped draft legal 
opinions and provided substantive ex parte legal advice to 
“educate [the judge] on all the relevant issues,” we 
determined that their participation did create an appearance of 
impropriety.  Id. at 307.  But Kensington is not similar to the 
case before us now because there is no allegation that Dichner 
actually participated in the proceedings.  The abuse-of-
discretion standard is applicable here. 
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arbitrary or unreasonable.  Id. at 565.  Given that there is no 
evidence that Dichner played any role in the consideration of 
this case, or that Chairman Pearce was less than diligent in 
screening her from the proceedings, and given further that the 
assertions about Dichner’s indirect influence are based on 
speculation, we cannot say that the Board abused its 
discretion by maintaining the Chairman on the three-member 
panel. 
 
B. Unfair Labor Practices 
 
Somerset also challenges the correctness of the 
Board’s determination that it engaged in unfair labor practices.  
In considering the Board’s decision, we accept factual 
findings as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, 
while subjecting legal conclusions to plenary review with 
deference to the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA.  Mars 
Home for Youth v. NLRB, 666 F.3d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.  It 
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Citizens Publ’g 
& Printing Co. v. NLRB, 263 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “In particular, we defer to 
the Board’s credibility determinations, and will reverse them 
only if they are inherently incredible or patently 
unreasonable.”  Grane Health Care v. NLRB, 712 F.3d 145, 
149 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 
 As to the Board’s legal determinations, “[f]amiliar 
principles of judicial deference to an administrative agency 
apply to the NLRB’s interpretation of the NLRA.  Therefore, 
the NLRB’s construction of the NLRA will be upheld if it is 
29 
 
‘reasonably defensible.’”  Quick v. NLRB, 245 F.3d 231, 240-
41 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 
488, 497 (1979)) (internal citation omitted).  “[C]ourts of 
appeals should not substitute their judgment for that of the 
NLRB in determining how best to undo the effects of unfair 
labor practices,” and the Board’s “choice of a remedy must be 
given special respect by reviewing courts, and must not be 
disturbed unless it can be shown that the order is a patent 
attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be 
said to effectuate the policies of the Act.”  Id. at 254 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 
 There is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the Board’s findings that Somerset unlawfully interrogated its 
employees and solicited their grievances, and that it retaliated 
against several employees by disciplining and discharging 
them due to their pro-Union activities.  Thus, as detailed 
herein, we must sustain the Board’s conclusion that Somerset 
violated § 8 of the NLRA. 
 
1. Interrogating Employees 
 
 An employer violates § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA “by 
interrogating employees about their union sympathies, when 
doing so suggests to the employees that the employer may 
retaliate because of those sympathies.”  Hedstrom, 629 F.2d 
at 314. 
 
 The Board believed several accounts from Somerset 
employees about management interrogating them before the 
election.  Konjoh asked Claudio how other employees would 
vote and asked her to vote “no” and give management a 
chance to improve conditions.  CareOne official Jessica 
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Arroyo asked CNA Avian Jarbo whether Somerset was 
“going to get a ‘no’ vote” from her.  (J.A. 30.)  Konjoh asked 
Stubbs what she thought of the Union and stated that, 
although Stubbs had a union at another job, “we don’t want 
one here.”  (J.A. 30.)  Illis, the highest-ranking management 
official at the facility, asked Tyler “where are you in terms of 
voting?” (J.A. 30 (editorial marks omitted).)  She further 
asked whether Tyler knew how her coworkers were voting, 
and whether Tyler could convince them to vote no.  
Throughout the course of those sorts of questions, “[n]o 
assurances were made to the employees” that they would not 
face retaliation for failure to cooperate with management.  
(J.A. 31.)   
 
 Though Somerset contests the characterization of the 
questioning as coercive, when employee testimony about the 
interrogations conflicted with that of Somerset managers, the 
ALJ and the Board credited the version given by the 
employees, explaining that they “testified in a 
straightforward, confident, consistent manner.”  (J.A. 30.)  
The Board’s credibility determinations are entitled to “great 
deference.”  Atlantic Limousine, Inc. v. NLRB, 243 F.3d 711, 
718 (3d Cir. 2001).  In light of the testimony credited by the 
Board, substantial evidence supports its conclusion that 
management officials at Somerset questioned employees in a 
manner unlawfully coercive under § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 
 
2. Retaliation 
 
 Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits an employer 
from taking adverse employment actions against an employee 
in retaliation for union membership or activities.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(3).  The Board applied the burden-shifting analysis 
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articulated in a case called Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083, 
1087 (1980), which was approved by the Supreme Court in 
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 
402 (1983). 12   Under Wright Line, “the employee must 
establish that the protected conduct was a ‘substantial’ or 
‘motivating’ factor [for the employer’s action].  Once this is 
accomplished, the burden shifts to the employer to 
demonstrate that it would have reached the same decision 
absent the protected conduct.”  251 NLRB at 1087.   
 
 Without recounting anew the facts summarized above, 
we conclude that the Board did indeed have substantial 
evidence to support its conclusions that Claudio, Napolitano, 
Jacques, and Wells were targeted because of their union 
support and that Somerset’s justifications for the adverse 
employment actions it took were simply pretextual. 
 
The principal response Somerset gives to the Board’s 
ruling on retaliation is that the stricter policies it instituted 
after the election were actually motivated by a “history of 
poor nursing home performance that long predated union 
activity at the facility.”  (Opening Br. at 50.)  But the timeline 
does not bear that out.  The deficiencies uncovered in the 
                                              
12 Although the Court later abrogated a portion of 
Transportation Management on grounds not relevant here, 
the central holding “remains intact.  The NLRB’s approach in 
Transportation Management is consistent with § 7(c) [of the 
NLRA] because the NLRB first required the employee to 
persuade it that antiunion sentiment contributed to the 
employer’s decision.”  Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 
267, 278 (1994).  
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December 2009 survey were deemed “isolated” (J.A. 3039), 
and, within weeks, Somerset had corrected them and 
submitted a successful correction plan to state authorities.  
The very next month, a resurvey found Somerset in 
substantial compliance.  In fact, no significant discipline or 
tightening of policy took place close to the December 2009 
inspection that Somerset suggests was the reason for its 
stricter policies.  Instead, the discipline began months later, 
immediately following the union election.  The timeline that 
Somerset urges us to consider thus supports the Board’s 
finding that Somerset was unlawfully motivated when it 
disciplined and discharged the four union activists.  See, e.g., 
Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 814 (3d Cir. 
1986) (timing and departure from past practice indicates 
unlawful motive); Hanlon & Wilson Co. v. NLRB, 738 F.2d 
606, 614 (3d Cir. 1984) (union animus and disparate 
treatment indicate unlawful motive); Champion Parts 
Rebuilders, Inc. v. NLRB, 717 F.2d 845, 850-51 (3d Cir. 
1983) (timing and disparate treatment establish unlawful 
motive). 
 
3. Solicitation of Grievances 
 
 Section 8(a)(1) of the Act prohibits an employer from 
interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the 
exercise of protected concerted activities.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1); see also id. § 157.  To establish a violation, “it 
need only be shown that under the circumstances existing, 
[the employer’s conduct] may reasonably tend to coerce or 
intimidate employees in the exercise of rights protected under 
the Act.”  Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305, 314 (3d Cir. 
1980) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).  An 
employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by expressly or impliedly 
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promising to remedy employee grievances if they reject the 
Union.  Id. 
 
 In this case, the Board credited employee testimony 
that, after the union petition was filed, Hutchens and Illis told 
employees they would try to “fix” things.  The Board made 
particular mention that management transferred Heedles and 
eliminated the proposed scheduling changes which had 
created employee unrest, that it eliminated one of Tyler’s job 
duties after she complained her job was “overwhelming,” and 
that it made garbage bags available in response to Stubbs’s 
complaint.  Substantial evidence supports those findings.  
Though some of the grievances, when viewed in isolation, 
may be quite minor, the Board’s findings collectively support 
the conclusion that Somerset solicited employees’ grievances, 
promised to fix them, and, in some cases, did fix them during 
the election campaign, all in violation of § 8(a)(1) of the 
NLRA. 
 
C. Reinstatement Remedies 
 
As a final argument, Somerset contends that, even if 
we reject its legal challenges to the Board’s findings of 
unlawful labor practices, we should not enforce the Board’s 
proposed remedies in full.  Specifically, it contends that 
Napolitano, Claudio, Jacques, and Wells should not be 
reinstated because they would put patients at risk.   
 
The Board does indeed have a “delicate responsibility” 
in the healthcare services context to “balanc[e] ... conflicting 
legitimate interests” in a way that safeguards patients and 
“effectuate[s] national labor policy.”  Beth Israel Hosp. v. 
NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501 (1978) (internal quotation marks 
34 
 
omitted).  In reviewing the Board’s determination, though, 
our “judicial role is narrow,” and an order of the Board “must 
be enforced” if it is rationally “consisten[t] with the Act” and 
“supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.”  
Id.  That principle accords with our generally deferential 
standard of review for the Board’s remedial orders, which we 
review for abuse of discretion.  Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400, 405 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc).  
Moreover, “[r]einstatement is the conventional correction for 
discriminatory discharges,” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 
313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941), and we are particularly hesitant to 
overturn that choice of remedy. 
 
The crux of Somerset’s argument is that, even if those 
four employees were unlawfully dismissed in retaliation for 
their unionizing activities, the Board failed to consider 
whether reinstatement was appropriate in light of safety 
concerns.  That, however, is not a fair assessment of the 
Board’s remedial analysis.  In applying the Wright Line test, 
the Board evaluated both whether Somerset acted with a 
discriminatory motive and “would have reached the same 
decision absent the protected conduct.”  251 NLRB at 1087.  
Therefore, the analysis for unfair labor practices in this case 
necessarily incorporated the question of whether safety 
concerns should preclude reinstatement because, if the 
employees were putting patients at risk, they could have been 
fired regardless of Somerset’s motives.  If Somerset could not 
prove that it would have discharged the four employees for 
unsafe conduct, it also could not show that the misconduct 
would have disqualified them from reinstatement.  As we 
have already recognized, substantial evidence supports the 
Board’s determination that the alleged performance 
deficiencies were merely pretextual reasons for dismissing 
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Napolitano, Claudio, Jacques, and Wells.  We therefore also 
conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that the safety concerns Somerset raises against 
reinstatement are likewise pretextual and invalid. 
 
Of greater concern to us is Somerset’s claim that the 
Board improperly ignored the evidence and expert opinion 
from the § 10(j) proceedings before the District Court for 
temporary injunctive relief.  The District Court reviewed the 
record developed before the ALJ, and it held eight days of 
additional evidentiary hearings and two days of oral argument.  
The additional evidence included expert testimony on patient 
safety not presented to the ALJ.  The Court then issued a 129-
page opinion discussing the case in exacting detail and 
concluded that reinstatement of Wells and Jacques would 
endanger Somerset’s patients more than it would advance the 
purposes of the NLRA.  Five months later, the Board issued 
its own decision to the contrary, ordering the reinstatement of 
both Wells and Jacques, without “specifically address[ing] 
the particular allegations against Jacques and Wells that 
motivated the district court to deny them interim 
reinstatement.”  (J.A. 2.)  We later ruled that the District 
Court’s decision was moot and instructed it to vacate its order, 
observing that a § 10(j) proceeding “gives a district court 
authority to enter temporary interim relief” even as the Board 
retains “exclusive authority to decide the merits of the case.”  
Lightner, 729 F.3d at 237 (internal quotation and editorial 
marks omitted). 
 
The NLRA is structured to allow dual (and potentially 
dueling) proceedings, as the Board has authority to make 
determinations to prevent unfair labor practices under 
§ 10(a) and the district courts are separately empowered to 
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evaluate petitions for temporary relief under § 10(j).  29 
U.S.C. §§ 160(a), (j).  If a district court comes to one 
conclusion about appropriate temporary relief in a § 10(j) 
proceeding, that does not preclude the Board from reaching a 
contrary conclusion on the merits under the power granted by 
§ 10(a).  As one court has put it, 
 
the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to render 
initial decisions in these labor matters and the 
courts [of appeals] merely review such 
decisions under a “substantial evidence” 
standard.  This is not affected by the fact that 
the district court judge who heard the Section 
10(j) petition had before him the same record 
that the ALJ had in the unfair labor practices 
proceeding. 
 
NLRB v. Kentucky May Coal Co., 89 F.3d 1235, 1240 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160).  In the sphere of labor 
relations, Congress has created an environment in which the 
district courts “attempt to predict what the eventual outcome 
of the Board’s proceedings will be and to act accordingly.  If 
the eventual outcome turns out to be different from what was 
predicted, however, it is obviously the prediction, not the 
outcome, that must be rejected.”  NLRB v. Q-1 Motor Express, 
Inc., 25 F.3d 473, 477 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994).13 
                                              
13 We are not insensitive to Somerset’s frustration over 
the course of proceedings in this case.  The NLRB initiated 
the § 10(j) action in the District Court.  Somerset was forced 
to defend itself exhaustively in those proceedings and did so 
with some success, only to have the Court’s decision 
effectively overturned five months later by an administrative 
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In its 2015 Order, the Board did expressly consider the 
District Court’s § 10(j) determination and reached a different 
conclusion, finding that the safety concerns were merely 
pretextual.  As to Jacques, the Board said that “before and 
after the incident in question,” Somerset routinely made her a 
charge nurse, “a position reserved for high-performing 
nurses.”  (J.A. 2.)  Somerset’s contemporaneous actions thus 
indicate that it “did not actually consider Jacques a threat to 
patient safety.”  (J.A. 2.)  As to Wells, the Board observed 
that she had, for months prior to the election, made 
scheduling errors similar to those for which she was 
discharged.  It was not until after the election that Somerset 
initiated rapidly escalating discipline, indicating that even 
Somerset did not see Wells’s errors as endangering patient 
safety until it wanted an excuse to dismiss her.  The Board 
therefore had substantial evidence to conclude that 
Somerset’s own actions establish that Jacques and Wells do 
not pose a danger to  
                                                                                                     
agency entitled to significant deference on judicial review. 
One may question the fairness and efficiency of giving 
the NLRB two bites at the apple, once before a district court 
and once before the Board, but that is the structure the NLRA 
creates in bifurcating adjudication of temporary and 
permanent relief.  The wisdom of using judicial resources as 
was done here, and of giving the NLRB more than one 
opportunity to go after a private party for the same alleged 
wrongdoing, is for Congress to address, not us. 
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patient safety.  We will not, therefore, overturn the 
reinstatement remedy.14 
                                              
14 Somerset also argues that Wells would have been 
discharged regardless of any retaliatory action because, 
following her discharge, Somerset discovered evidence of 
misconduct that would have led to her dismissal on non-
retaliatory grounds.  Somerset is correct that, if it can show it 
would have discharged Wells anyway based on after-
discovered evidence, reinstatement is an inappropriate 
remedy.  See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 
U.S. 352, 360 (1995) (“[E]ven though the employer has 
violated the Act, we must consider how the after-acquired 
evidence of the employee’s wrongdoing bears on the specific 
remedy to be ordered.”).  Specifically, Somerset contends that 
“Wells [] violated Somerset’s Technology Policy ... by 
forwarding a series of emails containing confidential 
Somerset information from her work computer to her home 
email address without permission.”  (Opening Br. at 55.) 
The Board does not contest the fact that Wells sent 
Somerset scheduling information to herself.  But it points out 
that it “deferred the matter to compliance proceedings ..., 
which will provide an opportunity to litigate whether this 
evidence affects Wells’ entitlement to reinstatement and 
backpay.”  (Answering Br. at 56 n.8 (citing J.A. 8 n.11).)  The 
Supreme Court has blessed this form of deferral in cases 
where the standard remedy of reinstatement and backpay has 
to be tailored to particular circumstances.  See Sure-Tan, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 902 (1984) (“This Court and other 
lower courts have long recognized the Board’s normal policy 
of modifying its general reinstatement and backpay remedy in 
subsequent compliance proceedings as a means of tailoring 
the remedy to suit the individual circumstances of each 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Somerset’s 
petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for 
enforcement. 
                                                                                                     
discriminatory discharge.”).  It is therefore premature for us 
to evaluate Somerset’s arguments regarding after-discovered 
evidence of Wells’s misconduct. 
